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Following its opening to trade and foreign investment in the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic 
growth has been modest at best, particularly in comparison with that of China.  Comparing these 
countries and reviewing the literature, we conclude that the relation between openness and 
growth is not a simple one.  Using standard trade theory, we find that Mexico has gained from 
trade, and by some measures, more so than China.  We sketch out a theory in which developing 
countries can grow faster than the United States by reforming.  As a country becomes richer, this 
sort of catch-up becomes more difficult.  Absent continuing reforms, Chinese growth is likely to 
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1.  Introduction 
During the decade that followed its severe economic crisis of 1982–85, the Mexican government 
implemented a series of market-oriented reforms that culminated in the implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.  These reforms included fiscal 
reforms, privatization of government operated firms, and opening the economy to trade and 
foreign investment.  In spite of these reforms, Mexico’s economic growth since 1985 has been 
modest, at best.  This growth is especially disappointing if we compare it with that of China, 
another large, less developed country that started opening itself to the rest of the world after 
Mexico. 
In this paper, we ask why Mexico’s reforms did not result in higher rates of economic 
growth.  We focus on the reforms that opened Mexico to trade and foreign investment.  It is 
worth noting that one of the authors was a proponent of these reforms as a means for achieving 
higher growth in Mexico (see Timothy J. Kehoe 1992, 1994).  Figure 1 presents data on 
Mexico’s trade in goods and services as a percentage of its GDP, while figure 2 presents data on 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Notice that Mexico’s apertura, or opening, resulted 
in large increases in trade and FDI.  (See Kehoe 1995 for the details of the reforms involved in 
the apertura.)  In particular, Mexico’s trade and inward FDI as shares of its GDP reached levels 
comparable to those achieved by China.  Figure 3 presents the disappointing data on economic 
growth in Mexico.  While real GDP per working-age person (15–64 years old) grew by 510 
percent (8.2 percent per year) in China over the period 1985–2008, it grew by only 10 percent 
(0.4 percent per year) in Mexico.
1  Notice that the vertical axis in figure 3 has a log base 2 scale, 
so that China’s relatively constant growth shows up as being close to linear. 
[Figures 1, 2, and 3 here] 
China and Mexico are major exporters and importers in the world economy.  In 1995, China 
had the largest merchandise trade among countries classified by the International Monetary Fund 
as emerging and developing, accounting for 12.7 percent of emerging and developing trade, 
while Mexico was second, accounting for 7.0 percent.  In 2008, China is still the largest trader at 
                                                 
1 We use real GDP per working-age person, rather than real GDP per capita, because it measures better an 
economy’s ability to produce goods and services, especially in the context of the neoclassical growth model that we 
discuss in section 4.  When we discuss welfare in section 3, we use real GDP per capita.  Another measure 
appropriate for welfare would be real GDP per adult equivalent.  All of the data used in this paper are available at 
www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe and at www.kimjruhl.com. 2 
22.3 percent, while Mexico has dropped to third, at 5.4 percent, slightly behind Russia.  China 
and Mexico had some of the largest receipts of FDI among emerging and developing economies. 
In 1995, China was the largest recipient of FDI to emerging and developing economies, 
accounting for 33.4 percent, while Mexico was second, accounting for 8.5 percent. By 2008, 
China has remained the largest recipient of FDI to emerging and developing economies, at 14.8 
percent, but Mexico has fallen to seventh, at 3.2 percent, falling behind Russia, Hungary, Brazil, 
India, and Saudi Arabia.
2 
We begin by reviewing the existing literature, asking whether it provides a convincing 
answer to the question of why Mexico stagnated after opening itself to trade while China grew 
rapidly.  Although a number of studies are informative, we do not find an answer to this 
question.  As Claustre Bajona, Mark J. Gibson, Kehoe, and Kim J. Ruhl (2010) argue, standard 
trade models do not imply that opening to trade increases productivity or real GDP, but that it 
increases welfare.  Examining the mechanisms through which opening to trade increases welfare, 
we find evidence that welfare increased more in Mexico than the real GDP data indicate and that 
the growth gap between Mexico and China is not as large.  Nonetheless, a large growth gap 
remains, and, to account for this growth gap, we need to identify a critical factor that impeded 
growth in Mexico but not in China, or a different factor that spurred growth in China but not in 
Mexico.  Performing a simple growth accounting exercise, we find that this sort of factor, when 
inserted into a growth model, would need to explain why total factor productivity (TFP) 
stagnated in Mexico while it grew rapidly in China.  We review a number of possible factors 
suggested by the literature — some associated with trade and foreign investment policies and 
others associated with domestic policies. 
We conclude by suggesting directions for future research.   In particular, we sketch out a 
theory suggested by the research of Stephen L. Parente and Edward C. Prescott (1994, 2002) and 
Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007).  In this theory, technology in the form of the stock of useable 
knowledge in the industrial leader — which we identify as being the United States over the past 
century — grows at a constant rate.  If institutions and economic policies are constant, this 
implies a constant rate of growth of real GDP per working-age person.  Developing economies 
like Mexico and China can grow faster than this rate by improving institutions and reforming 
policies.  The possibilities for such catch-up growth depend on the distance of the developing 
                                                 
2 FDI inflows are more volatile than merchandise trade, so the list of leaders changes more frequently. 3 
economy from the frontier, the level of real GDP per working-age person in the United States.  
In Mexico — which, in spite of its slower growth, is still closer to the United States in terms of 
real GDP per working-age person than is China — this catch-up growth is more difficult.  Our 
theory suggests that the factors that currently impede growth in Mexico, such as inefficient 
financial institutions, and insufficient rule of law, and rigidities in the labor market, do not yet do 
so in China because China has not yet reached a sufficient level of economic development.  We 
hypothesize that, as China grows, these factors will become more important and, absent 
significant reforms, growth in China will slow down sharply, as it has in Mexico. 
2.  Literature review 
We now survey the existing literature related to our question of why Mexico stagnated after 
opening itself to trade and foreign investment while China grew rapidly.  Since this literature is 
large, we focus on those studies particularly relevant to the theory that we sketch out in section 5. 
2.1. Cross-country growth regressions 
In contrast with the approach of this paper, which compares the experience of Mexico after it 
opened itself to foreign trade and investment with that of China, there is a large literature that 
includes measures of openness in cross-country growth regressions.  The literature on the 
empirical relationship between trade policy regimes and economic performance goes back to the 
1970s.  Sebastian Edwards (1989) provides a comprehensive summary of the early work.  It is 
worth noting that Edwards criticizes much of the previous literature, and in particular the World 
Bank (1987), for employing univariate measures of policies that divide countries into open or 
closed, noting that such divisions are often highly subjective and run the risk of simply verifying 
the policy preferences of the researchers doing the study. 
We focus on the seminal work of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995), who construct a 
univariate measure of openness that classifies a country as closed if it had any one of five 
characteristics:  (1) a high average tariff rate, (2) nontariff barriers on a large fraction of imports, 
(3) a socialist economic system, (4) a state monopoly over major exports, or (5) a high black-
market premium during either the 1970s or the 1980s.  Sachs and Warner find that countries that 
are open, in that they have none of these characteristics, have on average 2.4 percent per year 
higher growth in real GDP per capita than those that were closed.  Of particular relevance to the 4 
comparison between Mexico and China is Sachs and Warner’s classification of Mexico as closed 
up until 1986 but open thereafter and their classification of China as being closed.  They classify 
China as a socialist economy and note that, although China has progressively liberalized since 
1978, its trading system was still rife with quantitative restrictions at least as of 1994.  Updating 
the Sachs-Warner classification, Romain Wacziarg and Karen Horn Welch (2008) classify 
Mexico as open but China as still closed because of its socialist regime and its black market 
premium. 
Francisco Rodríguez and Dani Rodrik (2000) criticize Sachs and Warner, pointing out that 
the power of the openness variable in their regressions derives mostly from the state-monopoly-
of-exports and the black-market-premium criteria.  These criteria, Rodríguez and Rodrik argue, 
are not measures of trade policy per se and, overall, the Sachs-Warner openness variable serves 
as a proxy for a very broad range of institutional and policy variables.  Warner (2003) responds 
to this criticism by showing that the average tariff on imports of capital and intermediate goods 
has a significantly negative effect on growth and that the state-monopoly-of-exports and the 
black-market-premium criteria can be dropped as long as he controls for initial GDP per capita.  
It should be noted that, in Warner’s data set, Mexico has lower than average tariffs on capital and 
intermediate goods and China has higher than average tariffs.  As Rodríguez (2007) points out, 
the message of Warner (2003) is much more nuanced than that of Sachs and Warner (1995) and, 
in particular, openness seems to have a more positive effect on poorer countries than on middle 
income countries.            
Another attempt to respond to Rodríguez and Rodrik’s (2000) criticism of Sachs and Warner 
(1995) is that of David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2004), who examine the impact of first 
differences in openness to trade on growth.  They identify “globalizers” as countries that 
significantly increased their ratios of trade to GDP between the late 1970s and the late 1990s.  
Dollar and Kraay find that globalizers experienced large increases in their growth of real GDP 
per capita, while non-globalizers saw their growth rates decline. According to the Dollar-Kraay 
criterion, both Mexico and China are globalizers.   
Three general aspects of the literature are worth noting:   
First, there is a positive and robust relationship between a country’s trade as a share of GDP 
and its growth rate, as established in the work of such researchers as Jeffrey A. Frankel and 
David Romer (1999), Francisco Alcalá and Antonio Ciccone (2004), and Dollar and Kraay 5 
(2004).  As a number of researchers, including Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) and Rodríguez 
(2007), have pointed out, however, the trade share is not a direct measure of policy and the 
causal relation between the trade share and growth is problematical.  Howard L. M. Nye, Sanjay 
Reddy, and Kevin Watkins (2002), for example, argue that Dollar and Kraay’s attempt to relate 
their results involving changes in trade shares to changes in tariffs is highly sensitive to the years 
chosen for tariff changes and the years chosen for growth rates and that Dollar and Kraay’s 
results are not robust.   
Second and relatedly, the relationship between measures of policies related to openness and 
growth does not seem to be robust:  A number of researchers — including Ann Harrison (1996) 
and Edwards (1998) in addition to those whose work we have already discussed — find a large 
and significantly positive relationship between policies related to openness and growth.  Other 
researchers — like Ha Yan Lee, Luca A. Ricci, and Roberto Rigobon (2004) — find a positive, 
but small, relationship.  Still others — including Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco 
Trebbi (2004) in addition to those whose work we have already discussed — do not find a 
significant relationship between policies related to openness and economic growth.   Other 
researchers find more nuanced results:  In addition to, and in contrast with, the work of Warner 
(2003), Steve Dowrick and Jane Golley (2004) and David N. DeJong and Marla Ripoll (2006) 
find that openness has a significantly positive impact on growth only for developed countries, 
while Halit Yanikkaya (2003) actually finds that openness has a negative effect on economic 
growth for less developed countries. 
Third, many of the researchers who study the relationship between openness and growth do 
so without being closely guided by a theoretical model.  Other researchers, particularly those 
working in the 1990s, are guided by the theoretical work on endogenous growth by researchers 
such as Luis A. Rivera-Batiz and Paul M. Romer (1991).  In this sort of model, there are 
typically scale effects from positive externalities in production.  That is, everything else being 
equal, larger countries should grow more rapidly.  International trade can allow a small country 
to benefit from these positive externalities.  This sort of theory indicates that well-specified 
growth regressions need to control for an appropriate measure of country size when studying the 
impact of openness.  Typically, in these theories, a smaller country benefits more from opening 
to international trade than does a larger country.  Once again, the empirical results are mixed:  
Frankel and Romer (1999) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) find a positive relationship between 6 
population size and economic growth.  Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) 
and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) find the same relationship and also find a negative (although 
statistically insignificant) coefficient for the interaction term of population size with their 
measure of openess.  On the other hand, Chris Milner and Tony Westaway (1993), Harrison 
(1996), and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1997) find no significant link between measures of population 
size and growth.  David A. Backus, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Kehoe (1992) similarly find that 
growth and size of GDP are largely uncorrelated, but they do find evidence of significant scale 
effects in manufacturing, and evidence that these effects are larger and more significant when 
they control for a measure of openness suggested by the theory of Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991). 
2.2. Studies of Mexico’s stagnation 
We are by no means the first researchers to study why Mexico has stagnated in spite of its 
reforms.  In this section we review the research that identifies factors believed to impede growth 
in Mexico.  For each of these factors we ask:  Does China share this characteristic?  And, if so, 
why has it not impeded growth in China?  In many cases we find that the factors associated with 
slow growth in Mexico are also present in China, so we are left to ask:  Why do these factors 
impact growth differently in the two countries? 
The most popular set of theories for Mexico’s stagnation focuses on its inefficient financial 
system and lack of contract enforcement.   Raphael Bergoeing, Raimundo Soto, Kehoe, and 
Kehoe (2002, 2007), for example, compare the growth experiences of Mexico and Chile 
following their economic crises in the early 1980s.  While Mexico stagnated, Chile grew rapidly.  
After examining fiscal reforms, privatization, and reforms of policies related to trade and foreign 
investment policy in Mexico and Chile, these researchers conclude that the crucial difference 
between policies in Mexico and Chile are those related to the financial system and to bankruptcy 
proceedings.  They sketch out a model of firms with heterogeneous productivity and argue that 
an inefficient financial system can misallocate labor and capital, leading to a low measure of 
TFP.  Furthermore, inefficient bankruptcy proceedings can keep inefficient firms alive and 
impede the entry of new, more efficient firms, slowing down the growth of TFP. 
Anne Krueger and Aaron Tornell (1999) and Tornell, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza 
Martinez (2003) study the recovery of the Mexican economy following the financial crisis of 7 
1994–1995.  They find that, while the traded goods sector grew rapidly, the nontraded sector 
recovered sluggishly.  They argue that this occurred because domestic bank lending dried up 
after the crisis, and traded goods firms were able to obtain financing from abroad while 
nontraded goods firms were not.  One of the reasons that lending dried up was that poor contract 
enforcement — such as the inefficient bankruptcy procedures identified by Bergoeing et al. 
(2002, 2007) —  generated a large quantity of nonperforming loans.  Tornell, Westermann, and 
Martinez (2003) develop a model in which rapid GDP growth cannot be sustained over a long 
period if it is driven only by growth in the traded goods sector, because firms producing traded 
goods need nontraded inputs.   
The problem with identifying a poorly functioning financial system and lack of contract 
enforcement as the factors that differentiate Mexico from China is that China also has a poorly 
functioning financial system and lack of contract enforcement.  Thomas G. Rawski (1994) and 
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian (2005) establish that China has been able to achieve 
phenomenal economic growth with a poorly functioning financial system and legal system and 
without any significant reforms to these systems.  Studying the Chinese experience, Alessandra 
Guariglia and Sandra Poncet (2008) go so far as to question whether an efficient financial system 
is necessary for growth at all. 
Other researchers identify other possible impediments to growth in Mexico.  Gueorgui 
Kambourov (2009), for example, argues that a rigid labor market kept Mexico from benefiting as 
much from opening to trade as Chile did.  Nora Lustig (2001) identifies an institutional vacuum 
in the agricultural sector after government intervention there was reduced as leaving many 
producers with less access to credit and technical assistance.  Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Jesus 
Santamaria, and Juan Carlos Rivas Valdivia (2005) identify a sharp fall in public investment.  It 
is worth noting that Lustig and Moreno-Brid et al. also identify problems in the financial system 
as being significant barriers to growth in Mexico.   
The conclusion that we draw from these studies is that factors like an inefficient financial 
sector, lack of contract enforcement, and rigidities in the labor market kept Mexico from 
benefiting from its reforms to policies involving foreign trade and investment.  China also has 
these same problems, but we will argue that these did not impede growth as they did in Mexico 
because China is at a lower level of development.  Perhaps China’s growth is even part of 
Mexico’s problem.  M. Ayhan Kose, Guy Meredith, and Christopher Towe (2005), for example, 8 
identify increased competition from China in its export markets, as well as problems in the legal 
system and rigidities in the labor and telecommunications markets, as barriers to growth in 
Mexico. 
2.3. Studies of China’s fast growth  
A number of researchers have identified rapid TFP growth as the driving force behind Chinese 
economic growth.  Loren Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu (2009) find that about half of Chinese TFP 
growth was due to productivity differences between entering and exiting firms during 1998-
2005.  Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter J. Klenow (2009) identify reallocation of resources from 
inefficient firms to efficient firms as a significant determinant of this TFP growth.  We ask:  Why 
have these factors not been at work in Mexico? 
Policies related to foreign trade and investment played significant roles in the reallocation of 
resources that led to TFP growth.  Bajona and Tianshu Chu (2010) argue that China’s 2001 
accession protocol to the World Trade Organization forced the Chinese government (or gave 
reformers inside the government the political clout) to drastically cut subsidies to the state-
owned sector and show that this generated a reallocation from inefficient state-owned firms to 
efficient private firms.  Zuliu F. Hu and Mohsin S. Khan (1997) argue that reforms that led to 
FDI attracted efficient foreign firms to invest in China.  Zheng Song, Kjetil Storesletten, and 
Fabrizio Zilibotti (forthcoming) build a model to account for China’s recent growth experience, 
which is characterized by substantial reallocation within the manufacturing sector in an economy 
with large financial imperfections. 
It would be tempting to hypothesize that the mechanisms that generated TFP growth in 
manufacturing in China were not present in Mexico, but this does not seem to be the case.  In 
particular, using firm level data for Mexico, Ernesto López-Córdova (2003) finds that trade and 
foreign investment reforms resulted in large increases in productivity in the manufacturing sector 
in Mexico, especially in the machinery and equipment, computing equipment, and precision 
instruments industries.  This suggests that problem in Mexico is lack of productivity growth, not 
in manufacturing, but in the rest of the economy.  It further suggests that we should look at lack 
of competition in other sectors in Mexico — such as petroleum extraction, electricity, 
telecommunications, and transportation — for the factors inhibiting productivity growth. 9 
We could also hypothesize that China has been able to grow because it has a strong central 
government that has been able to overcome some of the problems associated with poorly 
functioning markets, while Mexico has not been able to do this.  This hypothesis is worth 
exploring, but it is worth pointing out two reasons for doubting it:  First, Mexico became a 
democracy only in the mid-1990s; previously it had a one-party system that was in many ways as 
strong and centralized as that in China.  Furthermore, the Mexican government controlled the 
banking system from 1982 through 1991, and Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007) identify the 
inefficient allocation of credit during this period as a major factor in Mexico’s poor economic 
performance.  Second, Bajona and Chu (2010) argue that until China joined the WTO, the 
banking system there served mostly to funnel savings into investment in inefficient state-owned 
enterprises.  Allocation of credit by the government seems to have been the major problem in the 
financial systems in both Mexico and in China, not a remedy for other problems. 
3.   Gains from trade and real GDP 
The empirical evidence on the link between trade and growth is inconclusive.  What do 
theoretical models of international trade predict should happen when a country liberalizes trade?  
Perhaps surprisingly, the workhorse models of trade — such as the Ricardian models of Rudiger 
Dornbusch, Stanley Fischer, and Paul A. Samuelson (1977) and Jonathan Eaton and Samuel S. 
Kortum (2002), or the imperfect competition models of Paul Krugman (1980) and Marc J. Melitz 
(2003) — do not yield a clear relationship between trade and real GDP.  In these models, real 
GDP can increase, can remain unchanged, and can even decrease after tariffs are reduced! 
This result follows from the way in which changes in the terms of trade are incorporated into 
real GDP.  Bajona et al. (2010) show that the change in real GDP from a change in tariffs can be 
decomposed into two parts: the change in real GDP at factor prices and the change in real tariff 
revenues,   
(1)  (, () ) (, () ) (, () )
F
tt t tt t tt t GDP p GDP p T p          , 
where  t p  is the terms of trade, and   is an ad valorem tariff.  If decreasing tariffs changes the 
country’s terms of trade, real GDP at factor prices will weakly decrease.  The lower tariffs also 
generate an increase in imports, and the tariff revenue associated with those imports, computed at 
the base period (higher) tariff rate, increases.  The change in real GDP is the net effect.  If real 
tariff revenues increase enough to offset the decline in real GDP at factor prices, real GDP 10 
increases; if the change in tariff revenues is small, real GDP decreases.  The effect of the terms 
of trade on real GDP in a country without tariffs is addressed in Ulrich Kohli (2004), and in 
models with tariffs, in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and Robert C. Feenstra, Benjamin R. Mandel, 
Marshall B. Reinsdorf, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2009). 
The ambiguous impact of trade liberalization on real GDP does not imply an ambiguous 
impact of liberalization on welfare:  All of the models considered by Bajona et al. predict that 
trade reform increases welfare.  Accurately measuring the gains from trade for Mexico and 
China is an inherently model specific exercise.  Costas Arkolakis, Arnaud Costinot, and Andrés 
Rodríguez-Clare (2010), for example, show that, for a class of models, the change in real income 
in a country is a function of the import penetration ratio and a parameter related to the elasticity 
of substitution between imports and domestic goods.  Changes in import penetration ratios are 
similar in Mexico over 1990–2000 and China over 1998–2008, suggesting that, as fractions of 
real GDP terms, the gains from trade in China and Mexico are similar, although in absolute 
terms, Mexico’s gains are much larger than China’s.  Rather than go into model specific details 
here, we consider two other measures:  an adjustment to real GDP to account for terms of trade 
effects and a measure that accounts for the gains from the greater varieties available through 
trade.  These measures indicate that Mexico has gained more from trade than has China.   
It is worth noting that this comparison assumes, for the moment, that China’s higher GDP 
growth was not itself a gain from trade.  We could restate our comparison as saying the gains 
from trade identified by standard models have been higher in Mexico than in China. 
3.1. Gains from the terms of trade 
Trade liberalization — and, more broadly, globalization — brings about changes in the terms of 
trade.  Changes in the terms of trade impact welfare in the country but will generally not translate 
into changes in real GDP, as discussed above.  Kohli (2004) argues that the invariance of real 
GDP to changes in the terms of trade makes real GDP a poor measure of country progress; 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and Feenstra et al. (2009) study the impact (or lack thereof) of the terms 
of trade on measures of productivity.  These authors suggest several alternatives to real GDP; 
here we use the real gross domestic income (GDI) of a country, as defined by the United 
Nations’ System of National Accounts, to capture the impact of changes in the terms of trade on 
welfare and productivity.    11 
Real GDI treats the domestic components of expenditure in the same way that real GDP 
does — the components are deflated by their respective price indices — but it differs in the 
deflation of the trade balance.  To compute real GDI, we deflate the trade balance by the import 










In figure 4 we plot the percentage deviation of real GDI from real GDP for Mexico and China.  
We refer to this measure as the terms of trade premium: the gain, relative to real GDP, that 
accrues to a country because of changes in the terms of trade.  In Mexico, the average terms of 
trade premium is 0.17 percent per year, but the crisis in 1994–1995 was accompanied by a sharp 
deterioration in the terms of trade; the impact of the financial crisis was worse than real GDP 
indicated, and the recovery more robust.  In China, the terms of trade have steadily deteriorated 
and the resulting adjustment to GDP is striking:  Chinese real GDP overstates the growth in real 
gross domestic income by almost 8 percentage points over the decade considered.  The intuition 
for this results is simple:  The policies that keep the relative price of imports in China high make 
Chinese consumers worse off than the real GDP data indicate. 
[Figure 4 here] 
3.2. Gains from new varieties 
The “new trade models” based on differentiated varieties and increasing returns to scale (for 
example, Krugman 1980 and Melitz 2003) imply that trade liberalization not only changes the 
prices of goods that were already available for consumption, but also changes the composition of 
varieties that are available for consumption.  Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) show that, following trade 
liberalization, newly traded goods can significantly change the composition of trade between 
countries.  Capturing the impact of changing varieties is difficult with standard measurements 
because it is difficult to account for a good when its initial price is not observed.  The seminal 
contribution in Feenstra (1994) is a result that, for constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preferences, the impact of new varieties on prices can be measured despite the absence of initial 
prices for some goods.  
We apply the technique developed in Feenstra (1994) to compute the gains from the 
importation of new varieties for China and Mexico.  In what follows, we construct a measure of 12 
the bias in import prices that exists when the changing composition of varieties is ignored in 
price indices.  This bias allows us to compute the gains from the greater varieties that can be 
consumed with trade in China and Mexico.  Our approach follows Christian Broda and David E. 
Weinstein (2006), which measures the gains from new varieties in the United States.   
We classify imports into goods, which are collections of varieties.  Goods and varieties enter 
utility through a nested CES utility function.  The set of all imported goods is G , and for each 
gG  , the set of all varieties available at time t is  gt I .  Note that we have assumed the set of 
goods is constant over time, while the set of varieties can change.  The sub-utility of imported 



















where  git x  is the consumption of variety i of good g  and  git d  is a variety specific demand 
shifter.  All of the varieties of a good have the same elasticity of substitution,  1 g   , but this 
elasticity may differ by good.  Goods are aggregated into a composite import good in a second 
CES aggregator, and, finally, the composite import good and a composite domestic good are 
combined in the utility function. 
We would like to price the composite import good.  Feenstra (1994) shows that, given the 
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The index 
M
g P is the CES ideal price index, for good g , computed over the varieties present in 
both periods,   1 g gt gt I II   , as derived in Kazuo Sato (1976) and Yrjö O. Vartia (1976).   gt   is 
the ideal log change weight, and   gt   is the share of the common varieties in total expenditure on 















This is an important result: it allows us to compute the change in the price index even though we 
do not have prices for all varieties in all periods.  Further details are available in Feenstra (1994) 
and Broda and Weinstein (2006). 
The second product on the right hand side of equation  (4) is the contribution of new 
varieties to the price index — what Broda and Weinstein name the aggregate import bias.  The 
lambda ratio,  1 gtg t    , measures the extent to which the changing varieties impact expenditure 
on the common set of goods.  If the new varieties have small expenditure shares, the lambda 
ratio is close to one, and the bias is small.  The lambda ratio is weighted by a term that involves 
both the good’s elasticity of substitution and the good’s weight in total import expenditure.  
Goods with fewer substitutable varieties, or goods with larger weights, have larger impacts on 
the bias. 
To compute the aggregate import bias, we define a good to be a three-digit category of the 
Harmonized System (HS).  We define a variety to be a six-digit HS code – country pair.  A good, 
for example, would be 090, “Coffee, tea, mate, and seed spices,” while a variety would be 
090111-Colombia, “Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated” from Colombia, which is a different 
variety than 090111-Costa Rica.  We have 164 goods.  In China, the median number of varieties 
per good was 300.5 in 1998 and grew to 406.0 in 2008.  In Mexico, the median number of 
varieties per good rose from 150.5 in 1990 to 230.5 in 2000.    
We use the country-specific elasticities estimated in Broda, Joshua Greenfield, and 
Weinstein (2006) in our calculations for China and Mexico.  The mean and median elasticities 
are reported in table 1.  Table 1 also summarizes the lambda ratios in the two countries.  The 
distributions of the lambda ratios are similar; the median lambda ratios are near 0.95 and the 95th 
percentile ratio is about 1.03.  The bias in the aggregate import price index, over the 11-year 
period, is 0.94 for Mexico: the price of a unit of the composite import in Mexico has fallen by 6 
percent over the period because of the increase in imported varieties.  The composite import 
price in China fell by about 5 percent.   
[Table 1 here] 
We can put these numbers into perspective by calculating the amount of extra income a 
consumer would need in order to achieve the same increase in utility over the period without the 
new varieties.    This equivalent variation is computed as the inverse of the aggregate import 
price bias, weighted by the share of imports in total expenditure.  We report the import weights 14 
and the equivalent variation in table 1.  The consumer in Mexico needs an extra 1.42 percent of 
his or her 1990 income — and in China, 1.01 percent of his or her 1998 income — to be 
indifferent to the new varieties of imports accumulated over the next ten years.   
In table 2 we summarize the impact of trade on real income growth.  Column 2 reports the 
annual growth rate of the terms of trade premium that we calculated in the previous section.  For 
China, this implies that real GDP overstates the growth in real income by 0.76 percent per year 
due to the deterioration of the terms of trade.  Accounting for both the gain in varieties and the 
adjustment for the terms of trade, the growth rate of real income per capita in China is 8.33 
percent, compared with the 8.99 percent growth in real GDP.  In Mexico, the gains from trade 
imply that real income has grown about 0.30 percent per year faster than real GDP.  As reported 
in the World Bank, in Mexico, real GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is 10,121 
2005 U.S. dollars in 1990 and 2,325 dollars for China in 1998.  The absolute gain from these two 
adjustments is 319 dollars per capita for Mexico in 2000, and a loss of 148 dollars per capita for 
China in 2008.   
[Table 2 here.] 
Our measurements suggest that Mexico, despite slow growth in GDP, has reaped substantial 
benefits from liberalization.  We should be clear, however, that our measurements are only 
capturing the improvement in welfare that comes from consuming less expensive goods — or 
from consuming new varieties of goods — as a result of lower trade barriers.  The gains from 
trade measured here do not account for other channels through which trade can impact welfare, 
such as technology that may be embodied in imported capital goods or spillovers from the 
operations of multinational firms.  We discuss these possibilities below.   
4.  Neoclassical growth model and power of productivity 
We now argue that a successful theory of why Mexico stagnated even as it opened itself to trade 
and foreign investment while China grew rapidly needs to focus on why productivity stagnated 
in Mexico while it grew rapidly in China.  To do so, we employ the growth accounting 
developed by Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007).  Kehoe and Prescott use the neoclassical growth 
model to guide their view of economic data.  The model features an aggregate Cobb-Douglas 
production function, 
(6)  tt t t YA K L
    , 15 
where  t Y  is output,  t A  is TFP,  t K  is capital, and  t L  is labor input.  If the working-age population 
grows at a constant rate,  0
t






  , then the 
economy has a balanced growth path in which all quantities per working-age person grow at the 
rate  1    except for hours worked per working-age person, which is constant.  In our growth 
accounting for Mexico and China, we assume that hours worked per worker is constant, which 
allows us to use the number of workers as a measure to the labor input.  We do this because we 
do not have data on hours worked for China.  Although we have such data for Mexico, we do not 
use them to be consistent.  (The results change very little, however, if we use Mexican hours 
data.)   
Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007) rewrite the production function (6) as 
(7)   
/(1 ) 1/(1 ) // / tt t t t tt YN A KY LN
     . 
They note that, along a balanced growth path, when  t A  grows at a constant rate, the capital-
output ratio  / tt KY  and the participation rate  / tt LN  are constant.  Kehoe and Prescott show that 
U.S. data over the period 1960–2000 are close to a balanced growth path.  Here we show that 
Chinese data over the period 1985–2008 are close to a balanced growth path, albeit at a very high 
rate of growth.  Figure 5 decomposes the growth in output,  / tt YN , measured as real GDP per 
working-age person in China into a productivity factor, 
1/(1 )
t A
  , a capital factor, 
/(1 ) / tt KY
   , 
and a labor factor  / tt LN .  Once again the scale on the vertical axis is log base 2.  Notice that the 
Chinese growth is close to balanced in that the growth in  / tt YN  is close to that in 
1/(1 )
t A
  , and 

/(1 ) / tt KY
    and  / tt LN  are close to constant.  To be sure, there are deviations from balanced 
growth behavior.  In the mid-1990s, growth in output  / tt YN  accelerates, and much of this 
acceleration is due to growth in the capital factor 
/(1 ) / tt KY
    and, especially, the labor factor 
/ tt LN .    
[Figures 5 and 6 here] 
Figure 6 presents the growth accounting for Mexico.  The poor performance in terms of real 
GDP growth is driven by an even worse performance in terms of TFP growth.  Since 1995, 
however, there has been some GDP growth, and that growth has been driven by TFP growth.  16 
Between 1995 and 2000, real GDP per working-age person grew by 3.2 percent per year, while 
overall, between 1995 and 2008, it grew by 1.7 percent per year. 
In our growth accounting, growth in human capital shows up as growth in TFP.  
Fluctuations in factor utilization also show up as fluctuations in TFP, although this is probably 
more important in studying business cycle moments, like the 1994–1995 financial crisis in 
Mexico, than it is in studying growth over a decade or longer.  The Kehoe-Prescott growth 
accounting in equation (7), in contrast to that of Robert M. Solow (1957) and Edward F. Denison 
(1962), takes into account the feature of the neoclassical growth model that, in a balanced growth 
path, as technological growth occurs, consumers will save so as to keep the capital-output ratio 
constant.  Researchers like José De Gregorio and Jong-Wha Lee (2004) and Barry Bosworth and 
Susan M. Collins (2008), who use a growth accounting that looks at increases in output per 
worker as a function of variables that include capital per worker, typically find increases in TFP 
and increases in capital roughly equally important in accounting for growth.  Our growth 
accounting — which imputes to the productivity factor the increase in capital necessary to keep 
the capital-output ratio constant and imputes to the capital factor only the increases in the capital-
output ratio, that is, capital deepening — finds that capital is much less important and that 
increases in productivity are typically the driving force of economic growth. 
Understanding that it is the growth in TFP that is essential for accounting for why some 
countries grow faster than others allows us to reassess some of the research that employs growth 
regressions.  Of the research that we have discussed, Backus et al. (1992), Edwards (1998), and 
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) directly address the need to account for TFP growth, making some 
measure of productivity growth, not growth in real GDP per capita, the dependent variable in 
their regressions.   
Many other authors, going back to the late 1950s, have realized that understanding TFP 
growth is essential for understanding economic growth.  Of particular relevance for the 
theoretical framework that we sketch out in the next section are William W. Lewis (2004) and 
Parente and Prescott (2002).  Lewis (2004) uses case studies of different countries to show that 
productivity in other sectors, besides just manufacturing, is essential for determining relative 
income levels across countries.  He also uses anecdotal evidence to argue that it is government 
policies that discourage the adoption of the best available technologies from the rest of the world 
that keep countries relatively poor.  Parente and Prescott (2002) develop a model in which it is 17 
government policies and institutions like monopolies that impede new technology adoption that 
keep productivity, and therefore income per capita, low. 
5.  Directions for future research and a proposed theoretical framework 
It is very possible that there are other aspects of openness — besides those emphasized by 
standard trade models — that generate growth.  Researchers like Natalia Ramondo and Andrés 
Rodríguez-Clare (2009) and Ellen R. McGrattan and Prescott (2009) have stressed the role of 
FDI in transferring technology from one country to another.  Researchers like Thomas J. Holmes 
and James A. Schmitz, Jr. (2001), Schmitz (2005), Gibson (2007), and James A. Costantini and 
Melitz (2008) have stressed the role of international trade in giving firms the incentives to pay 
the costs of adopting new technology.   
Given our question of why Mexico stagnates while China grows, we need to ask of all of 
these papers why the mechanisms that they study worked in China but not in Mexico.  A 
potential answer is that most of Mexico’s trade and FDI inflows are with the United States.  It 
may be that the predominance of intrafirm trade between Mexico and the United States reduces 
the incentives toward competition and innovation that would arise from trade and foreign 
investment reforms.  Furthermore, Mexican manufacturing seems to be complementary with 
U.S. manufacturing, while Chinese manufacturing is a substitute for both Mexican and U.S. 
manufacturing.  The emergence of China may have reduced the incentives toward innovation in 
both the United States and Mexico.  These are possibilities worth studying, but it may be, as the 
work of researchers like López-Córdova (2003) suggests, that it is not the manufacturing sector 
— or at least those subsectors most involved in trade — that is responsible for Mexico’s 
stagnation, but other sectors. 
We propose a theoretical framework for studying these sorts of hypotheses as well as for 
reconciling some of the contradictory evidence on openness and growth in the empirical 
literature.  We follow Kehoe and Prescott (2007) in using the economic performance of the 
United States over the past century as the starting point for our theory.  Figure 7 presents the data 
on real GDP per working-age person in the United States, 1900–2008.  Notice how close these 
data are to a constant growth path with 2 percent growth per year.  The average growth rate 
during this period was 1.99 percent per year.  There are small business cycle fluctuations around 
the constant growth path, and there is the major deviation during the Great Depression of 1929–18 
39 and the subsequent World War II buildup.  The United States has been the industrial leader, 
the richest major country in the world, since the early twentieth century, when it took over this 
role from the United Kingdom.  We follow Kehoe and Prescott in hypothesizing that the near 
constant growth in the United States since then is driven by a near constant growth rate in the 
stock of knowledge useful in production.  It should be stressed that this stock of knowledge is not 
measured TFP.  Measured TFP depends on the stock of knowledge but also depends on the 
efficiency with which factors of production are allocated across firms and sectors in the 
economy.   
[Figure 7 here] 
The data in figure 7 are fascinating and invite speculation and theorizing.  It is difficult, for 
example, to reconcile them with the once popular endogenous growth theories of authors like 
Romer (1986).  As we have mentioned, the United Kingdom was the industrial leader during the 
nineteenth century, and it is possible that the European Union or even China might assume that 
role later in the twenty-first century.  It is also possible that the technological progress may be 
slowly accelerating:  According to Angus Maddison (1995), the average growth in the United 
Kingdom of real GDP per capita 1820–1900 was 1.2 percent per year.  While all of this is 
interesting, it is largely irrelevant to our question involving growth in Mexico and China, 
countries that are far behind the industrial leader. 
[Figure 8 here] 
We hypothesize that the stock of knowledge, which has increased very smoothly over the 
past century or more, can be adopted, perhaps at some cost by countries that are behind the 
industrial leader.  This would give rise to trend growth of close to 2 percent per year, at least 
after capital and labor have had time to adjust.  The absolute level that a specific country is at 
compared to the industrial leader depends on its institutions and economic policies.  Changes in 
these institutions and economic policies can cause depressions or booms.  Eventually, however, 
if institutions and policies stabilize, and after capital and labor have adjusted, the country returns 
to trend growth.  Figure 8 presents data on real GDP per working-age person in Mexico, 1900–
2008 (except for 1910–1920 during the Mexican Revolution).  After a period of slow growth 
involving the Revolution and the Great Depression of the 1930s and its aftermath, Mexico began 
to grow rapidly during the early 1950s.  Between 1953 and 1981, Mexican real GDP per 
working-age person grew by 3.8 percent per year.  From 1981 through 1995, Mexico suffered the 19 
great depression analyzed by Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007), contracting by 1.7 percent per year.  
From 1995 to 2008, Mexico returned to close to trend growth, growing by 1.7 percent per year.  
[Figure 9 here]  
To compare China with Mexico in terms of absolute level of income, we use the PPP real 
GDP data published by the World Bank (2008).  Figure 9 depicts the data.  China has been 
growing more rapidly than Mexico but is still substantially poorer in 2008.  Specifically, China’s 
GDP per working-age person in 2008 is 7,986 2005 U.S. dollars, which is only 38.5 percent of 
Mexico’s 20,755 dollars, and its GDP per capita in 2008 of 5,712 dollars is only 42.5 percent of 
Mexico’s 13,434 dollars.  In terms of our theoretical framework, Mexico is not experiencing the 
rapid catch-up growth that China is experiencing now because it already had this sort of catch-up 
during the period 1953–1981.  
In the theory that we propose, it is easier to grow faster than the industrial leader when an 
economy is far behind.  An economy like China — or Mexico in 1953–1981 — can grow rapidly 
even with an inefficient financial system, lack of rule of law, and rigidities in the labor market.  
As the country gets closer to the industrial leader, however, rapid growth stops and the country 
levels off at the trend growth rate of GDP per working-age person of 2 percent per year or a little 
less.  This seems to have occurred in Western Europe in the early 1970s, in Japan in the early 
1990s, and in Chile in the late 1990s, to mention a few cases.  How far short of the industrial 
leader the country levels off depends on its institutions and economic policies.  Chile, for 
example, after spectacular growth following its great depression in the early 1980s, has had a 
level of real GDP per working-age person and a growth rate similar to those in Mexico since 
about 1998.  Unless China continues to reform, we can expect economic growth there to slow 
down sharply at some point.  It is an open question whether or not this slowdown will occur 
when China is still behind Mexico in terms of real GDP per working-age person.
3 
Many open questions remain to be resolved for our theory to be useful in accounting for the 
economic development of countries like Mexico and China:  How can we modify the sorts of 
growth regressions to capture the periods of rapid growth followed by slowdowns predicted by 
                                                 
3 Our theory suggests that it may be more fruitful to compare Mexico to economies at a similar level of economic 
development.  Brazil is a frequently cited example.  It is a country that has about 70 percent of the real GDP per 
working-age person of Mexico in 2008 but that has experienced higher rates of growth than Mexico since 2000.  
Over the period 1995–2008, however, the growth rate of GDP per working age person in Brazil has been 1.1 percent 
per year, less than Mexico’s 1.7 percent per year.  It has yet to be seen that Brazil is performing significantly better 
than Mexico. 
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the theory?  Is openness to trade and foreign investment even necessary for rapid growth when a 
country is very far behind the industrial leader?  India’s recent experience suggests not.  Specific 
questions about the experience of Mexico remain to be resolved as well:  Why was the period of 
rapid growth, 1995–2000, following the enactment of NAFTA so short?  Or, put another way, 
why was the recovery following the 1982–95 great depression so modest?  It may be that 
Mexico’s slower growth since 2000 is the product of the contraction of the U.S. manufacturing 
sector and of competition with China.  Perhaps most importantly, what sorts of reforms does 
Mexico need to enact to resume rapid catch-up growth?  We hypothesize that these are reforms 
that eliminate the barriers to growth of an inefficient financial system, lack of rule of law, and 
rigidities in the labor market.  In terms of more specific reforms, promoting competition in 
nonmanufacturing sectors like petroleum extraction, electricity, telecommunications, and 
transportation could spur productivity growth.21 
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Table 1 
Calculation of Broda-Greenfield-Weinstein (2006) welfare gains from variety 
   Mexico 
1990-2000    China 
1998-2008 
 Mean  Elasticity 6.704 5.634 
 Median  Elasticity  3.070    3.488 
  5th percentile lambda ratio  0.832    0.789 
 Median  lambda  ratio  0.956    0.954 
  95th percentile lambda ratio  1.028    1.031 
  Import price bias  0.939    0.947 
  Import log-change weight  0.224    0.185 
 Equivalent  variation  (percent)  1.417    1.013 
    






Real GDP growth versus real income growth in Mexico and China 
Annual growth rate 
(percent) 
Real GDP  
per capita 





 per capita 
China 1998-2008  8.989  –0.761  0.101  8.329 
Mexico 1990-2000  1.782  –0.169 0.142 2.093 
 





























  Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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  Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009 and IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 3 

































Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 4 
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Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations. 30 
Figure 5 



































Sources: Conference Board Total Economy Database, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
World Bank World Development Indicators, and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6 































Sources: Conference Board Total Economy Database, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
World Bank World Development Indicators, and authors’ calculations. 31 
Figure 7 































2 percent growth trend
 
Sources:  Maddison (2010), U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
and U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010).  
 
Figure 8 































2 percent growth trend
 
Sources:  Maddison (2010), Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (2009), IMF 
International Financial Statistics, and World Bank World Development Indicators. 32 
Figure 9 
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Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 